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Abstract
Slowing climate change will almost certainly require a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, but agreement on who
should reduce emissions by how much is difficult, in part because of the self-serving bias—the tendency to believe that
what is beneficial to oneself is also fair. Conducting surveys among college students in the United States and China, we
show that each of these groups displays a nationalistic self-serving bias in judgments of a fair distribution of economic
burdens resulting from mitigation. Yet, we also show, by disguising the problem and the identity of the parties, that it
is possible to elicit perceptions of fairness that are not influenced by national interests. Our research reveals that the
self-serving bias plays a major role in the difficulty of obtaining agreement on how to implement emissions reductions.
That is, the disagreement over what constitutes fair climate policy does not appear to be due to cross-national differences
in what constitutes a fair distribution of burdens. Interventions to mitigate the self-serving bias may facilitate agreement.
Keywords: self-serving bias, climate change, negotiation, fairness, veil of ignorance.
1 Introduction
Although debate continues about technical and scientific
issues surrounding climate change, the human dimen-
sions of the problem pose significant impediments to de-
veloping and implementing solutions to mitigate its im-
pact. Slowing climate change will almost certainly re-
quire a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, but agree-
ing upon who should reduce emissions by how much has
thus far proven an intractable problem. Despite long-
standing agreement that combating anthropogenic cli-
mate change is a serious issue that necessitates interna-
tional cooperation (United Nations, 1992), failures such
as occurred in Copenhagen in 2009 show that nations are
unable to agree on what constitutes a fair sharing of the
emissions reduction burden (Lange et al., 2010). In this
paper we show that the difficulty of reaching agreement
is, in part, due to the self-serving bias—the pervasive ten-
dency to believe that what is beneficial to oneself is also
fair. The self-serving bias, and not intrinsic cross-cultural
differences in what is judged a fair distribution of sacri-
fices, may represent the primary obstacle standing in the
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way of agreement.
Alternatively, one might consider the social dilemma
structure of the problem (e.g., Tavoni et al., 2011) or other
strategic concerns (e.g., Finus, 2001, chapter 9) to be the
largest obstacles in combating climate change. This pa-
per takes these structural issues as givens and implicitly
assumes that they are the reason formal agreements are
needed in the first place. In particular, a pre-condition
for getting parties to agree to self-sacrifice in pursuit of
a collective solution is to reach an agreement regarding
the fair distribution of burdens. This paper focuses on
the role that the self-serving bias, as opposed to differ-
ing fundamental beliefs about fairness, plays in impeding
such agreement.
The countries that take part in climate change negotia-
tions differ on myriad dimensions of potential relevance
to a fair assignment of burdens, including their levels
of past and projected emissions, the costs of mitigation,
and the benefits obtained by successfully addressing the
problem. Research on the self-serving bias (Messick &
Sentis, 1983; Bazerman et al., 1999; Diekmann et al.,
1997; Rabin, 1995; Konow, 2000) shows that asymme-
tries between parties on dimensions relevant to a negoti-
ation contribute to the bias, because people place greater
weight on dimensions that support a settlement that is
more beneficial to themselves (Thompson & Loewen-
stein, 1992; Wade-Benzoni et al., 1996; Di Tella et al.,
2007).
The self-serving bias has been documented and shown
to play a central role in negotiation impasse both in lab-
oratory studies (Loewenstein et al., 1993; Babcock et
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al., 1995; Carlson & Russo, 2001; Farmer & Pecorino,
2002) and field studies (Babcock et al., 1996; Lange et
al., 2010). Moreover, because negotiators are averse to
accepting settlements that are even slightly below what
they perceive to be fair (Loewenstein et al., 1989), and
because the self-serving bias leads to incongruous per-
ceptions of fairness, there is often no settlement upon
which all parties will agree, even when large joint gains
are available from agreement. The large number of na-
tions involved in climate change negotiations makes the
problem even worse, not only by increasing complexity
over and above that which would exist with only two par-
ties but also by multiplying the number of possible self-
serving arguments.
To illustrate the self-serving selection of fairness
norms, consider the following study by van Avermaet
(reported in Messick, 1985). Subjects filled out ques-
tionnaires and were then given money which was to pay
themselves as well as another person in the study for
their work. If told that the other person was given half
the amount of time to work and completed half as many
questionnaires, subjects kept on average two-thirds of the
money, an allocation proportional to both the time spent
and work done. But if the other person was given twice as
long and completed twice the number of questionnaires,
subjects instead chose the norm of equal division and
kept half the money for themselves. And finally, subjects
tended to keep more than half the money in both the case
where the other person was given twice as much time and
filled out half as many questionnaires and the opposite
case (half the time and twice the questionnaires). This in-
dicates that subjects chose time spent or work completed
as the fair payment criterion depending on which was in
their own favor.
In the context of climate change, the difference in fair-
ness norms is evidenced by the focus of some policy
proposals on equal entitlement (equal per capita emis-
sion allotment) and of others on relative needs and bur-
dens of developing versus developed nations (Klinsky &
Dowlatabadi, 2009). As for which parties prefer which
policies, Lange et al. (2010) show that selections of fair-
ness criteria by agents involved in international climate
policy tend to correspond to their material self-interest.
Furthermore, agents are more likely to believe that self-
interest influenced other parties’ selections of fairness cri-
teria than to believe they themselves were so influenced.
Though this evidence is consistent with self-serving bias
(or conscious self-serving arguments, as Lange et al.
(2010) propose), Lange et al.’s, study cannot rule out the
possibility that there are legitimate cross-cultural differ-
ences in perceptions of what is fair, and that these dif-
ferences lead to disagreement independent of the role of
material self-interest.
Indeed, comparisons of fairness judgments between
Americans and Chinese provide evidence of subtle dis-
similarities. While members of the two cultures have
similar judgments of fairness in health and safety risk
scenarios, Chinese subjects tend to give other goals be-
sides fairness more weight and are less likely to con-
sider the fair option to be the best option overall (Bian
& Keller, 1999). In the domain of price fairness, Chi-
nese consumers consider their own price more unfair if a
friend was given a better price than if a stranger was given
a better price, while Americans are less sensitive to this
distinction (Bolton et al., 2010). Gao (2009) found that
Chinese were more tolerant of the use of market power
than European cultures. One general pattern is that Chi-
nese judgments of fairness tend to be more context depen-
dent than those of Americans. To the extent that fairness
judgments influence negotiation positions, disentangling
the role of self-serving bias may give hints as to the sort
of interventions that can most effectively facilitate agree-
ment.
In particular, given the importance of agreement on
a suitable plan to mitigate climate change, establishing
whether disagreement is driven by self-serving bias, or
by fundamental cross-cultural differences in what is per-
ceived as fair, is of great significance. By using a con-
trolled experiment, we attempt to establish the role of
self-serving bias. Because we cannot randomly assign
individuals to nationality and assess the effect that this
has on their fairness judgments, we employ an approach
that draws on the concept of the veil of ignorance first
proposed by John Harsanyi and named by John Rawls
(Harsanyi, 1953; Rawls, 1971; Norton & Ariely, 2011).
The veil of ignorance is a judgment of social justice (fair-
ness) made by people who do not know their own in-
terests because they do not know what role they will be
assigned. A classic application of the veil of ignorance
is an indictment of slavery based on the observation that
few would endorse the institution if they were unaware of
whether they were the ones who would be enslaved.
We explore how judgments of the fairness of alloca-
tions of economic sacrifices resulting from reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions are influenced by placing in-
dividuals in situations in which they are aware of their
own national interests or not. We presented subjects with
graphs that displayed current and projected per capita
GDP (or income) of two countries (or farmers, in one sce-
nario). The different possible divisions could be altered
dynamically with a slider that was controlled by the sub-
ject (Figure 1), which led to shifts in per capita income
over time for both parties. Subjects could move the slider
between one extreme that placed all burdens on one party
and the other extreme that placed all burdens on the other
party, until they found the division of sacrifice that they
deemed most fair.
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We randomly assigned students from the United States
and China to one of three scenarios that varied the de-
gree to which they were aware of their own national
interests—i.e., were behind the veil of ignorance. One
scenario, designed to show the impact of the self-serving
bias, made the domain (climate change) explicit as well
as the two countries involved (China and the United
States). A second scenario disguised the countries (using
the generic labels “Country A” and “Country B”), and
also altered the nature of the environmental problem so
subjects would be unlikely to realize that it was about cli-
mate change. A third scenario disguised the problem even
further, casting it as a negotiation between two neighbor-
ing farmers. Although the scenarios differed on multiple
dimensions, the relative economic consequences of shift-
ing burdens between the parties were identical in all three.
Our goal in this research is not to suggest implement-
ing a veil of ignorance in real climate negotiations as a
policy recommendation (though if doing so were possi-
ble, we would support it). Our contribution is to demon-
strate a simple experimental procedure that can isolate
the effect of self-serving bias from the possible effects
of cultural differences in perceptions of fairness. Doing
so helps us clearly establish that self-serving bias plays
a role in the inability of parties to reach agreement. Our
findings also suggest that interventions that eliminate the
self-serving bias in international climate policy negotia-
tions may be of tremendous value.1 Finally, our study
identifies subpopulations that may be more susceptible to
self-serving bias, which may facilitate targeted interven-
tions to influence opinion and allow agreement.
2 Method
The survey was conducted as a randomized experiment
with a 2 (Population) X 3 (Context) X 2 (Slider position)
between subjects design. The two populations were Chi-
nese students who completed the survey in Mandarin and
American students who completed the survey in English.
We used students for two reasons. First, students rep-
resent a relatively similar demographic across different
countries. Although college students are not represen-
tative of the population of either China or the U.S., the
similarity of their social and economic position enhances
the validity of comparing and averaging across their re-
sponses. Second, college students are sufficiently intelli-
gent and well educated to think about the kinds of issues
that were posed by the elicitation method, and they have
1We recognize that developing such interventions is extremely chal-
lenging. A variety of methods, such as encouraging the parties to con-
sider the problem from one another’s perspective, have been found to
backfire (Caruso et al., 2006; Epley et al., 2006).
credibility as a nation’s likely future policy makers. Sub-
jects were recruited either at the end of classes or from
public locations at their respective universities. We de-
scribe the recruitment procedures and monetary incentive
below. Following recruitment, an experimenter guided
subjects to a computer terminal, where they completed
the online survey.
Each subject was randomly assigned to one of three
contexts, all of which involved two parties that needed to
share the economic burden associated with solving a joint
problem. One context involved the U.S.A. and China,
the second involved two generic countries (“Country A”
and “Country B”), and the third involved two neighbor-
ing farmers (“Farmer A” and “Farmer B”). The key sec-
tions of the description for each of the three contexts are
presented in Table 1. In addition to this context, the
economic state of the two parties was summarized by
per capita GDP (USA/China and CountryA/B contexts)
or income (FarmerA/B context) and associated projected
growth rates for each of the two parties. This information
was presented numerically as well as graphically and was
identical for each of the three contexts.
After seeing this information, subjects were presented
with graphs that displayed current and projected per
capita GDP (or income), under different possible divi-
sions of the economic burden associated with solving
the problem (Figure 1). The different possible divisions
could be altered dynamically with the slider. As the slider
was moved, the lines in the graphs indicating both coun-
tries’ (or farmers’) “with sacrifice” per capita GDP (or
income) shifted, and subjects could move the slider un-
til they found the division of sacrifice that they deemed
most fair. To test and control for anchoring effects, the
starting position of the slider was randomized across sub-
jects to be all the way to the left or all the way to the right.
Subjects were not aware that the study involved Chinese
and American populations, that there were three different
contexts (they were only aware of the particular context
in which they made a choice) or that the slider position
was randomized.
After submitting their decision, subjects were told
what percentage of the burden they had allocated to each
party and were presented with a table indicating the nu-
merical implications of this decision (per capita GDP or
income for each of the two parties in the year 2010, 2020,
2030 and 2040). The same graph and slider were pre-
sented on this page (with the slider starting at the position
they had specified on the previous page), and subjects had
the opportunity to revise their decision. As they moved
the slider on this page, the numbers in the table as well
as the lines on the graph changed. After submitting the
slider position this second time, subjects answered sev-
eral attitudinal and demographic questions.
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Table 1: Three survey contexts.
USA/China
The two countries must cut greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the negative effects of climate change.
Cutting emissions will necessarily reduce per capita GDP now and in the future. There are many
ways that the sacrifice can be divided between the two countries. Your task will be to specify how
the countries should share the substantial economic sacrifices that they need to make. Assume that
the sacrifice has to be made: the question is of how it should be divided.
CountryA/B
On the border shared by the two countries lies a river. The two countries must build a dam on this
river to avoid serious floods. Building the dam will reduce per capita GDP now and in the future.
There are many ways that the sacrifice can be divided between the two countries. Your task will be
to specify how the countries should share the substantial economic sacrifices that they need to make.
Assume that the sacrifice has to be made: the question is of how it should be divided.
FarmerA/B
Uphill from the two farmers lies a stream. The two farmers must divert this stream to prevent it
from running through their land, flooding their residences, and damaging their crops. Diverting the
stream will cost a significant amount of money now and in the future, but will save their farms from
very severe damage. There are many ways that the sacrifice can be divided between the two farmers.
Your task will be to specify how the farmers should share the substantial economic sacrifices that
they need to make. Assume that the sacrifice has to be made: the question is of how it should be
divided.
Figure 1: Graphical fairness elicitation.
2.1 Construction of Stylized Model of Rel-
ative Burdens
Our goal in presenting per capita GDP for the U.S. and
China both with and without the necessary sacrifices
needed to combat climate change was not to develop a
model that was as realistic as possible; nor was it to cap-
ture the underlying uncertainty that is unavoidable in such
an endeavor. Rather, our goal was to create a simplified
version of the problem that captured a few of its most
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important features.
We based the model on parameter estimates taken
from maximally authoritative sources. Because the U.S.
GDP growth is not expected to have dramatic long-term
changes, we used the historic 30-year average accord-
ing to data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Because China’s GDP growth is very unlikely to remain
at recent historic levels, such an assumption for China
would have been inappropriate. Instead, we referred to
a Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper (Wilson &
Stupnytska, 2007) for projections of China’s GDP growth
over the next 30 years. To make the presentation and in-
terpretation of this information as simple as possible for
subjects, we used the average projected growth rate over
this time frame, and we expressed all numbers in terms
of nominal rather than real GDP. Population growth rates
for both countries were assumed to remain at their 2009
levels.
The most controversial assumption of the model is that
the necessary economic sacrifice required to combat cli-
mate change is 1% of world GDP. This estimate was
taken from the Stern Review on the Economics of Cli-
mate Change (Stern, 2006) written for the British gov-
ernment. Because our scenario involved only two parties,
we used 1% of joint GDP as the required sacrifice.
With these figures, we calculated the absolute dollar
sacrifice that must be made by the two parties. The slider
presented to subjects (Figure 1) operated linearly on this
absolute dollar amount. That is, if located one third of
the way from the left, the U.S.A. (or Country/Farmer
A) would bear two-thirds of the absolute dollar cost and
China (or Country/Farmer B) would bear one-third. The
implications of this division on per capita GDP (or in-
come) with sacrifice would then be immediately reflected
in the graph.
We reiterate that this model is intended only as a qual-
itatively appropriate simplification of the economics un-
derlying the problem. For example, our design does not
attempt to incorporate other features that are relevant to
fairness, such as how each party’s historic behavior has
contributed to the problem (Rive et al., 2006). Also, to
allow for a graphical elicitation procedure that does not
require multiple dependent inputs, our study simplifies
the negotiation process to include only two parties. That
is, rather than attempting to capture all the inherent com-
plexity of multi-national climate change negotiations, our
design serves as a proof of concept that the relative roles
of self-serving bias and cultural differences in fairness
judgments can be disentangled.
The key property of international climate negotiations
that is reflected in our design is the fact that one party is
wealthier but growing more slowly and the other party is
poorer but growing more quickly. Even substantial devi-
ations in the parameters used would leave these features
unchanged. It is also important to note that the only nu-
merical details initially given to subjects were the cur-
rent per capita GDP (or income) and the growth rate for
each party. The model of relative burdens was presented
only graphically and the potentially confusing numerical
details were not presented to subjects. To avoid over-
whelming them with information, we showed subjects
numerical implications of their choices only after mak-
ing their initial decision. At this point they could revise
their choice if they so desired.
2.2 Recruitment procedures
The survey was conducted with subjects recruited from
Renmin University of China in Beijing, China and from
Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A. The Renmin University subjects were recruited
from large class lectures with a brief announcement of
the opportunity to participate in a survey for a fixed cash
payment of 15 Yuan (approximately US$2.25). Interested
students were taken to a computer lab where they com-
pleted the survey online. Seats were not assigned and so
it was clear to subjects that responses could not be traced
to particular individuals. Furthermore, dividers between
computers prevented communication between subjects.
Subjects were not informed of the topic of the survey in
advance, but were told that it would take approximately
15 minutes and had no impact on their standing in the
class from which they were recruited.
Approximately half the Carnegie Mellon University
subjects were recruited by the same method. To reach
the required number of subjects, however, it was neces-
sary to use an additional recruitment procedure. In the
student center, which is centrally located on campus and
frequented by most students, a researcher was stationed
with several laptop computers. All Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity subjects were given a cash payment of $5 (roughly
equivalent in purchasing power to the 15 Yuan given to
Chinese subjects). One minor difference in procedure at
Carnegie Mellon University was that there were no di-
viders between computers. However, subjects were in-
structed not to communicate during the survey and all
subjects complied with this instruction.
3 Results
There were 292 Renmin University subjects and 429
Carnegie Mellon University subjects. However, 97 of the
Carnegie Mellon University subjects were not U.S. citi-
zens. Because country of citizenship is directly relevant
to the self-serving bias in these contexts, the main anal-
ysis is restricted to the 332 Carnegie Mellon University
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Table 2: Final ratio (percent burden on China/B).
US China t-test
USA/China
41.69
(20.53)
n = 108
26.33
(14.88)
n = 102
t = −6.17
p < .0001
CountryA/B
33.92
(18.85)
n = 125
33.57
(18.04)
n = 106
t = −0.15
p = .88
FarmerA/B
37.91
(20.27)
n = 99
34.76
(20.63)
n = 84
t = −1.04
p = .30
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 3: Nominal per capita GDP (or income) in 2040.
US China
USA / China $162,924 / $39,854 $150,680 / $44,378
Country A / B $156,730 / $39,854 $156,451 / $42,246
Farmer A / B $159,910 / $40,967 $157,399 / $41,895
subjects who are also U.S. citizens and the 292 Renmin
University subjects (all of whom were Chinese citizens).
3.1 Demographic and Attitudinal Data
The vast majority of subjects from each population were
between 18 and 20 years old (76.7% in China and 77.4%
in the U.S.). Details are provided in Tables 4 and 5 in the
Appendix.
In addition to demographic information, subjects were
asked several questions relating to global warming, the
environment, patriotism and social issues. The biggest
differences between the two populations are in their re-
sponses to the environmental questions. Chinese sub-
jects are less satisfied with the quality of air, the quality
of water and efforts to preserve the environment in the
city or area in which they live. Furthermore, we expected
Chinese subjects to be hesitant to report low patriotism.
For this reason, we included other questions that we sus-
pected would correlate with their political attitudes. In
particular, the Chinese government opposes both gam-
bling and pre-marital sexual activity, though both are in
fact commonplace. Though opposing the Chinese gov-
ernment directly is forbidden, holding divergent views on
these topics is more acceptable. Detailed results for these
attitudinal questions are presented in Tables 6 and 7 of
the Appendix.
3.2 Fairness Judgments
The American and Chinese subjects strongly disagreed
on the fair division of burden in the USA/China context,
in a manner consistent with the self-serving bias. How-
ever, their judgments of what constitutes a fair division
were virtually identical when behind a mild veil of ig-
norance. Thus, the different perceptions of what is fair
in the USA/China context did not result from inherent
cultural differences. In the USA/China context, Ameri-
can subjects proposed that China should bear 41.7% of
the cost while Chinese subjects specified that they should
bear 26.3% of the cost (t = −6.17, p < .0001). How-
ever in the CountryA/B context, American subjects spec-
ified that country B (which was equivalent to China in
the first scenario) should bear 33.9% of costs and Chi-
nese subjects specified that country B should bear 33.6%.
These mean results are presented in Table 2, while the
implications of these judgments on nominal per capita
GDP (or income) in the year 2040 are presented in Ta-
ble 3. A two-way ANOVA reveals this interaction be-
tween population and context to be highly significant,
F (1, 437) = 18.49, p < .0001.
As for the Carnegie Mellon University subjects who
were not U.S. citizens, their mean judgment of the fair
burden on China in the USA/China context was 33.23%
(n = 31), which is lower than that of U.S. citizens
(t = 2.02, p < .05) and higher than that of Chinese citi-
zens (t = 2.05, p < .05). Their mean judgments were
not significantly different in the CountryA/B (38.12%,
n = 33) or FarmerA/B (38.67%, n = 33) contexts
(t = −1.04, p = .30 and t = −0.91, p = .37, respec-
tively).
A more detailed breakdown of the distribution of re-
sponses of U.S. and Chinese citizens is presented in Fig-
ure 2. Note that the difference between the USA/China
context and the CountryA/B context for both the Ameri-
can and Chinese subjects is driven not by a small number
going to extremes, but was produced by a more incremen-
tal mean-shift of each population.
To examine the data in more depth and to control
for the various demographic differences between the two
populations, we ran regressions with the percent burden
on the second party (China, Country B or Farmer B) as
the dependent variable. The main insight from these re-
gressions is that the self-serving bias is very robust to sta-
tistical controls in the USA/China scenario, and the lack
of difference is equally robust in the other two scenarios.
Furthermore, there is evidence of what could be called
“motivated anchoring” on the part of Chinese subjects.
That is, only in the USA/China context, Chinese subjects
were more likely to propose divisions that favored China
when they did not have to move the slider very far to
do so. This effect is not present for American subjects,
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Figure 2: Distribution of fairness judgments by context and population.
F (1, 194) = 0.01, p = 0.92. The fact that this effect is
found only for the USA/China scenario supports the idea
that the bias is motivated. That is, subjects did not exhibit
such anchoring when behind the veil of ignorance. Table
8 in the Appendix presents these models broken down by
context and also for all three contexts combined.
For a more detailed examination of the predictors of
responses in the USA/China scenario, where we observe
self-serving bias, we conducted regressions separately
for each population and including all of the attitudinal
variables (Tables 9 and 10 in the Appendix). The main
insights gained from the regressions of U.S. citizen re-
sponses are that Democrats are less self-serving and those
who are very patriotic are more self-serving. As for Chi-
nese citizens, the self-serving bias is stronger for males
and stronger for those who study natural sciences. Also,
the tendency for Chinese subjects to give more self-
serving judgments when the slider begins on the end of
the scale favoring China is robust to controls.
Finally, we ask whether agreement between the two
countries increases when subjects are placed behind the
veil of ignorance. A statistic to measure potential agree-
ment is the proportion of pairs of U.S. and Chinese sub-
jects whose judgments are compatible. That is, we cal-
culate the probability that a random U.S. subject and a
random Chinese subject in our sample give fairness judg-
ments that would require no additional concessions by ei-
ther side for an agreement to be achieved. Assuming two
continuous and identical distributions of responses—i.e.,
the judgments of what is fair are identically distributed
across countries—then the maximum possible agreement
frequency would be .5. We therefore construct an index
of agreement relative to this theoretical maximum and ex-
press the result on a zero to one scale—an index score
of zero indicates agreement between the two populations
never occurs, while a score of 1 indicates that subjects
from one country are as likely to agree with subjects from
the other country as with those from their own (agree-
ment frequency of .5). In the USA/China context, the
index of agreement between US-China pairs is a modest
.54. However, in the CountryA/B context, the index of
agreement between US-China pairs is .95. The index of
agreement for the FarmerA/B context is also high (.87).
This improvement in the veil of ignorance context is quite
dramatic and suggests that, once we remove the nation-
alistic self-serving bias, agreement may occur with very
high frequency.
4 Discussion
We first demonstrated that differing perceptions of fair-
ness pose a problem for obtaining international agree-
ment on the distribution of the economic burden of mit-
igating climate change. In judging what is “fair,” sub-
jects from the U.S.A. and from China provided very dif-
ferent responses. Both groups’ ideas of fairness tended
towards their own national interests. The likely resulting
impasse mirrors the outcome of recent high-level negoti-
ations, such as in Copenhagen in 2009.
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In light of the large disagreement between American
and Chinese subjects in the USA/China context, the most
dramatic finding is that this difference is completely elim-
inated by merely labeling the parties “Country A” and
“Country B” and changing the problem from climate
change to a different but analogous situation. We argue
that this points to self-serving bias as the driving force
behind disagreement, as opposed to fundamental cultural
differences in beliefs about what is fair. Moreover, as we
anticipated, our results indicate that common ground in
allocating the burden of mitigating climate change is pos-
sible if negotiators can somehow be immunized against
the self-serving bias.
The fact that no demographics affected assessments of
fairness in the two veil of ignorance conditions (with the
possible exception of gender for American subjects, but
only in the neighboring farmers context) further points
to the robustness of the methods. Only where countries
were identified and the context was familiar did varia-
tions in demographics matter, and they mattered in a fash-
ion consistent with the values of those groups (e.g., those
who are more patriotic). The fact that certain subpopu-
lations exhibit greater tendency to be influenced by self-
serving bias also raises the possibility that these groups
could be targeted in any intervention designed to allevi-
ate the bias.
The point of this exercise has not been to estimate the
fair distribution of greenhouse gas mitigation burden for
the U.S. and China. Nor has it been to propose the veil of
ignorance as a feasible intervention in real climate negoti-
ations. Instead, it is to suggest that there could be a broad
consensus about the fair distribution of burdens between
different parties in this kind of negotiation. Moreover, by
using an experiment in which our manipulated treatment
variable affects the presence of self-serving judgments,
we show that disagreement is not due to ingrained cul-
tural differences in beliefs about fairness. We therefore
go beyond existing research in more cleanly demonstrat-
ing the impact of self-serving bias as an impediment to
reaching agreement. Our study gives reason for optimism
that interventions to mitigate self-serving bias, if discov-
ered, can greatly improve our prospects of reaching an
international agreement on greenhouse gas emissions re-
duction and climate policy.
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Appendix
Table 4: Race by population.
USA China
White 43.7% Han 92.1%
Black/African American 6.9% Zhuang 0.7%
Asian 36.1% Manchu 1.4%
Indian/Pacific Islander 5.7% Hui 0.7%
Hispanic 3.9% Miao 1.0%
Multiracial 3.3% Uyghurs 0.3%
Other 0.3% Tujia 0.3%
Yi 0.3%
Mongols 1.4%
Other 1.7%
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Table 5: Demographics by population.
USA China Difference between distributions
Age 18–20 77.4% 76.7% χ2 = 9.3
21–25 19.0% 23.0% p < .05
26–35 2.7% 0.3%
35+ 0.9% 0.0%
Sex Male 56.3% 42.8% χ2 = 11.4
Female 43.7% 57.2% p = .001
Hometown Urban 29.8% 64.0% χ2 = 97.5
Semi-urban 58.4% 20.2% p < .001
Rural 11.8% 15.8%
Major Humanities 8.5% 4.8% χ2 = 104.9
Social Sciences 25.7% 66.6% p < .001
Natural Sciences 65.9% 28.6%
Political affiliation∗ Democrat 37.4%
Republican 12.4%
Independent/Other 20.8%
None 29.5%
∗ Due to the lack of political freedom in China, political affiliation is not an applicable question.
Table 6: Patriotism and social issues items.
Some people talk about patriotism being “love for a country”. How patriotic do you yourself feel toward [the
USA/China]?
USA China
Not at all patriotic 6.1% 0.4% χ2 = 87.2
Not very patriotic 25.6% 4.5% p < .0005
Fairly patriotic 54.6% 60.8%
Very patriotic 13.7% 34.4%
Which of the following best describes your feelings toward gambling?
USA China
It should be illegal 2.1% 36.9% χ2 = 188.3
It should be discouraged but legal 39.2% 49.8% p < .0005
It should be neither encouraged nor discouraged 55.3% 13.2%
It should be encouraged 3.3% 0.0%
Which of the following best describes your feelings toward pre-marital sexual activity?
USA China
It should be illegal 0.9% 4.2% χ2 = 82.5
It should be discouraged but legal 22.7% 54.9% p < .0005
It should be neither encouraged nor discouraged 68.1% 38.4%
It should be encouraged 8.3% 2.5%
To what extent do you believe that governments should strive for equality, that is they should attempt to make
everyone in a society equally well off?
USA China
It is not something that government should try to do 28.6% 7.9% χ2 = 84.8
It is somewhat important 46.7% 42.8% p < .0005
It is very important 20.5% 48.3%
Don’t know 4.2% 1.0%
Note: The patriotism question was taken from a survey commissioned by the BBC.
(http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/pdfs/2002_december_bbc_radio_4_patronism_poll.pdf)
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Table 7: Global warming and environmental items.
How much do you know about global warming or climate change?
USA China
I know a great deal about it. 21.4% 27.4% χ2 = 3.9
I know something about it. 78.3% 72.6% p = .14
I have never heard of it. 0.3% 0.0%
How serious of a threat is global warming to you and your family?
USA China
Not at all serious 6.3% 6.3% χ2 = 28.6
Not very serious 37.1% 57.3% p < .0005
Somewhat serious 46.1% 31.9%
Very serious 10.6% 4.5%
How serious of a threat is global warming to people in the World in general?
USA China
Not at all serious 0.9% 0.0% χ2 = 3.2
Not very serious 8.1% 6.6% p = .36
Somewhat serious 44.0% 44.4%
Very serious 47.0% 49.0%
Temperature rise is a part of global warming or climate change. Do you think rising temperatures are
a result of human activities, a result of natural causes, or both?
USA China
Human activities 16.9% 18.1% χ2 = 1.6
Natural causes 5.1% 3.1% p = .45
Both 78.0% 78.8%
In the city or area where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the quality of air?
USA China
Satisfied 57.2% 17.0% χ2 = 143.0
Dissatisfied 25.3% 72.6% p < .0005
Neither 17.5% 10.4%
In the city or area where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the quality of water?
USA China
Satisfied 68.1% 28.5% χ2 = 105.1
Dissatisfied 19.6% 55.6% p < .0005
Neither 12.4% 16.0%
In the city or area where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with efforts to preserve the environ-
ment?
USA China
Satisfied 23.2% 7.6% χ2 = 56.5
Dissatisfied 52.4% 80.9% p < .0005
Neither 24.4% 11.5%
Note: These questions are taken from the Gallup World Poll set of core questions.
(http://media.gallup.com/dataviz/www/WP_Questions_WHITE.pdf)
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Table 8: OLS regression analysis.
DV: Final Ratio USA/China only CountryA/B only Farmers only All Contexts
(Percent Burden on China/B) (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3a) (3b) (3c) (4a) (4b) (4c)
USCITIZEN 15.35*** 6.455 10.54* 0.354 4.886 5.482 3.147 -0.138 1.078 6.252*** -1.364 0.762
(2.486) (5.201) (5.436) (2.440) (4.609) (5.085) (3.032) (5.908) (6.674) (1.539) (3.705) (3.928)
USACHINA -5.336 -5.515*
(3.362) (3.345)
FARMERAB 0.860 0.684
(2.782) (2.772)
USCITIZENxUSACHINA 13.38*** 12.62**
(5.003) (4.974)
USCITIZENxFARMERAB 3.159 3.472
(3.793) (3.774)
MALE -7.022* -6.652* -3.806 -4.351 -3.369 -2.979 -3.653 -4.017
(3.628) (3.552) (3.622) (3.663) (4.604) (4.697) (2.797) (2.783)
MALExUSCITIZEN 7.157 5.424 -2.917 -2.695 12.55** 11.32* 4.107 3.577
(5.114) (5.083) (4.982) (5.081) (6.248) (6.548) (3.805) (3.823)
MALExUSACHINA -4.046 -3.654
(4.716) (4.695)
MALExUSCITIZENxUSACHINA 3.620 2.930
(6.556) (6.519)
age21plus -0.726 -1.577 1.491 0.947 -0.208 -0.376 0.677 0.371
(3.074) (3.046) (2.953) (3.076) (3.584) (3.791) (1.823) (1.855)
raceBLACKxUSCITIZEN -1.389 0.141 -0.565 1.120 -4.266 -5.385 -0.925 1.029
(7.317) (7.114) (5.904) (6.232) (10.75) (11.09) (4.273) (4.303)
raceASIANxUSCITIZEN -1.148 -0.710 1.587 1.506 1.196 0.723 0.346 0.330
(4.073) (4.091) (3.724) (3.784) (4.632) (4.764) (2.376) (2.367)
raceOTHERxUSCITIZEN -1.651 1.181 -3.130 -3.850 2.563 1.855 0.0449 0.410
(4.874) (4.872) (6.012) (6.187) (6.562) (6.641) (3.277) (3.298)
raceOTHERxCHINACITIZEN -0.0583 -0.0718 5.900 5.591 7.915 4.835 5.591 4.890
(7.105) (6.843) (7.383) (7.411) (7.230) (7.607) (4.155) (4.128)
SLIDERSTARTZERO -8.862** -8.856** 5.082 5.587 -1.576 -1.445 -1.546 -1.133
(3.629) (3.521) (3.670) (3.704) (4.510) (4.645) (2.237) (2.231)
SLIDERSTARTZEROxUSCITIZEN 11.39** 8.523* -4.297 -3.307 -4.084 -3.716 0.408 0.435
(5.150) (5.038) (5.017) (5.096) (6.186) (6.392) (3.079) (3.064)
DEMOCRAT -9.977*** -3.224 1.372 -4.271*
(3.806) (3.788) (4.550) (2.233)
MajorHUMANITIES 2.804 0.121 6.107 3.231
(5.202) (5.771) (6.411) (3.248)
MajorNATSCI -4.207 -0.993 2.534 -0.610
(2.862) (2.875) (3.757) (1.763)
patriotismVERYxCHINACITIZEN 1.311 2.074 7.913 3.834
(3.806) (3.839) (4.929) (2.353)
patriotismVERYxUSCITIZEN 13.50*** 8.704 1.955 9.243***
(4.497) (5.363) (7.292) (3.138)
Constant 26.33*** 34.63*** 35.45*** 33.57*** 32.02*** 31.90*** 34.76*** 36.15*** 32.66*** 31.38*** 35.42*** 34.32***
(1.783) (3.237) (3.636) (1.795) (3.033) (3.490) (2.230) (3.813) (4.497) (1.123) (2.497) (2.749)
Observations 210 210 210 231 231 230 183 183 181 624 624 621
R2 0.155 0.198 0.278 0.000 0.039 0.060 0.006 0.054 0.071 0.026 0.071 0.098
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The variable USCITIZEN is equal to 1 for Carnegie Mellon University subjects who are also U.S. citizens and is equal to 0 for Renmin University subjects
(recall that CMU subjects who are not U.S. citizens are excluded from this analysis). The variable raceOTHERxUSCITIZEN is equal to 1 for American subjects
who identified themselves as Indian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic, Multiracial or Other and is equal to 0 otherwise. The variable raceOTHERxCHINACITIZEN is
equal to 0 for the Chinese subjects who identified themselves as Han. Majors were coded as humanities, social sciences or natural sciences and these classifications
were used to create the dummy variables MajorHUMANITIES and MajorNATSCI. The patriotismVERY interaction variables are equal to 1 for subjects who
identified themselves as very patriotic and equal to 0 otherwise. Finally, the variable SLIDERSTARTZERO is equal to 1 if the slider starting position was randomly
determined to be to the far left (zero burden on China/Country B/FarmerB) and 0 if the slider starting position was randomly determined to be to the far right (full
burden on China/Country B/FarmerB).
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 6, No. 7, October 2011 Behind the veil of ignorance 614
Table 9: OLS regression analysis for US citizens and USA/China context only.
DV: Final Ratio
(Percent Burden on China/B) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MALE 0.173 0.0182 0.549 -2.191 -1.306
(4.114) (4.219) (4.299) (4.515) (4.756)
age21plus -2.329 -2.428 -2.592 -2.391 -4.478
(4.864) (4.987) (5.017) (5.396) (5.946)
raceBLACK -1.786 -2.566 -3.481 0.123
(8.629) (8.477) (8.936) (9.426)
raceASIAN -1.218 -0.0391 -0.308 -0.858
(4.785) (5.049) (5.110) (5.372)
raceOTHER -1.607 1.832 0.983 3.221
(5.724) (5.845) (6.254) (6.866)
DEMOCRAT -11.08** -8.943* -7.793
(4.561) (4.735) (5.047)
MajorHUMANITIES 7.124 6.441 6.989
(7.520) (8.743) (9.263)
MajorNATSCI 0.353 0.882 1.049
(4.931) (5.173) (5.356)
patriotismVERY 13.08** 13.01**
(5.509) (5.850)
equalityZ -0.232 -0.666
(2.168) (2.262)
gamblingZ 2.236 1.706
(2.523) (2.706)
sexualZ 0.768 0.494
(2.523) (2.758)
knowledgeZ 1.774
(2.251)
threatyouZ 1.211
(2.503)
threatworldZ -0.969
(2.559)
temperatureZ -1.174
(2.348)
airZ 2.876
(2.654)
waterZ -4.384
(2.793)
preservationZ 0.718
(2.179)
SLIDERSTARTZERO 2.864 2.826 0.653 0.919 0.841
(4.143) (4.236) (4.236) (4.396) (4.672)
Constant 40.50*** 41.42*** 44.16*** 40.19*** 38.80***
(4.143) (4.973) (6.071) (6.491) (6.991)
Observations 108 108 108 102 102
R2 0.006 0.007 0.078 0.142 0.179
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The patriotism item is included as the patriotismVERY dummy for ease of
interpretation. The other attitudinal variables (none of which significantly predict
the dependent variable) are included as z-scores. Higher values are associated with
greater belief in the importance of the government pursuing equality for equalityZ,
greater approval (or less disapproval) for gamblingZ and sexualZ, greater knowledge
of climate change for knowledgeZ, greater concern for threatyouZ and threatworldZ,
more belief that climate change is due to human activity for temperatureZ and more
dissatisfaction for airZ, waterZ and preservationZ.
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Table 10: OLS regression analysis for China citizens and USA/China context only.
DV: Final Ratio
(Percent Burden on China/B) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MALE -7.202** -7.191** -5.987** -6.217** -7.832**
(2.804) (2.849) (2.920) (3.068) (3.331)
age21plus 1.145 1.148 -0.682 -0.322 2.197
(3.468) (3.487) (3.521) (3.780) (4.226)
raceOTHER -0.150 -0.655 -0.754 3.698
(5.562) (5.486) (5.572) (6.738)
MajorHUMANITIES -1.593 -4.236 -4.057
(7.384) (7.683) (8.155)
MajorNATSCI -7.420** -7.552** -4.958
(3.076) (3.280) (3.659)
patriotismVERY -1.651 -1.255
(3.391) (3.777)
equalityZ -0.973 -1.548
(1.651) (1.688)
gamblingZ -1.661 -2.026
(1.797) (1.886)
sexualZ -0.626 0.0750
(1.547) (1.654)
knowledgeZ -0.914
(1.683)
threatyouZ -0.361
(2.030)
threatworldZ -0.107
(1.891)
temperatureZ 1.700
(1.754)
airZ 0.206
(2.147)
waterZ 2.764*
(1.649)
preservationZ 1.560
(1.779)
SLIDERSTARTZERO -8.521*** -8.521*** -8.946*** -10.36*** -10.34***
(2.863) (2.877) (2.828) (2.948) (3.239)
Constant 34.11*** 34.11*** 36.64*** 37.97*** 35.41***
(2.609) (2.627) (2.781) (3.304) (3.609)
Observations 102 102 102 97 94
R2 0.145 0.145 0.195 0.231 0.293
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
